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RESUMEN 
Este trabajo de titulación discute cómo la solidez de regímenes de derechos humanos 
influye en su cumplimiento por parte de los Estados. Elabora una discusión teórica sobre 
„cumplimiento‟ analizando conceptos como „obligación‟, „precisión‟ y „delegación‟ al 
establecer regímenes. Además examina por qué la naturaleza de los regímenes de derechos 
humanos representa un desafío para la soberanía estatal. El caso de estudio analizado en 
este trabajo es la Comisión Intergubernamental de Derechos Humanos de ASEAN 
(AICHR, por sus siglas en inglés) y sus perspectivas de acción en contra de violaciones a 
los derechos humanos de la comunidad Rohingya en Myanmar. El análisis muestra que la 
falta de precisión en su base legal y un excesivo respeto a normas culturales relacionadas al 
concepto de „no-intervención‟ dinamitan la capacidad de la Comisión para promover y 
proteger los derechos de los Rohingya. 
 
  
8 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation paper discusses how the solidity of human rights regimes influences 
State‟s compliance. It elaborates a theoretical discussion on „compliance‟ by discussing 
concepts as „obligation‟, „precision‟ and „delegation‟ when establishing regimes. It further 
examines why the nature of human rights regimes represent a challenge for State‟s 
sovereignty. The analyzed case study in which the dissertation paper focuses on is the 
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) and its prospects for 
acting against human rights violations to which the Rohingya community is subject in 
Myanmar. The analysis shows that lack of precision in its legal basis and excessive regard 
to cultural norms related to the concept of „non-interference‟ undermine the Commission‟s 
capacity to effectively promote the respect of the rights of the Rohingya. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The effective enforcement of rules within a regime depends on several factors. 
These include a precise definition of norms as well as solid structures which ensure 
compliance to the regime. The interactions of States within a regime, however, can be 
altered by each State‟s self-interest, as the provisions of the regime may obstruct the 
normal exercise of its sovereignty. In the field of human rights, international human rights 
treaties can be perceived as intrusive and threatening, as they demand the State‟s effort 
towards the immediate addressing of a particular violation. The balance between 
sovereignty and responsibility towards human rights is, according to some authors, more 
swiftly decided when norms, as mentioned before, are strong enough to ensure compliance. 
However, weaker structures of human rights institutions and systems are more likely to fail 
to guarantee the respect of human rights norms. In this dissertation paper, the prospects of 
successful promotion and protection of human rights of an institution will be assessed in 
order to determine its efficacy when addressing a pressing issue.  
The International Crisis Group (2013) describes that violence against the Muslim 
Rohingya minority and Muslims in Myanmar, which became evident with international 
media coverage since 2012, is not a new phenomenon. Discomfort against them dates back 
to the colonial period, when large groups of Indians came to Myanmar as different kinds of 
labor, including not only Hindus but also people belonging to other religions (International 
Crisis Group, 2013, p. 2). Many of these immigrants became „moneylenders‟, the main 
source of credit in the rice-growing areas and are remembered to be “hated figures”, 
especially during the Great Depression, when borrowers were unable to pay lending money 
back and were foreclosed by the moneylenders (International Crisis Group, 2013, p. 2).  
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 Yegar (1972) argues that intermarriage between Indian Muslims men and Burmese 
Buddhist women became widespread after the enactment of the 1938 Buddhist Women 
Special Marriage and Succession Bill (Yegar, 1972, p. 33). However, this was one of the 
triggers of tensions between the two communities, as there was a “rise of Burmese 
nationalism […] accompanied by a certain religious and cultural revival” (Yegar, 1972, p. 
35). What Yegar recalls as Zebardees, the offspring of the mixture between Indian 
Muslims and Burmese Buddhists, were seen as a semi-foreign community, were 
immediately rejected by the same nationalist feeling as Indian immigrants were (Yegar, 
1972, p. 35).  
 Riots and skirmishes over working places and jobs, and because of Burman 
nationalism, became extremely violent in the 1930s, when hundreds of Indians and Indian 
Muslims were killed in several parts of the country (International Crisis Group, 2013, p. 2). 
According to Yegar, who cites the 1931 census of British Burma, there were 130.524 
Muslims in the regions of Maungdaw and Buthidaung, in Arakan State (Yegar, 1972, p. 
95). Violence in the following years forced the Arakanese Muslims to group, resort to arms 
and demand an exclusively Muslim State. However, the rule of Gen. Ne Win starting in 
1962, which started a ruthless government in the country that would last for decades, 
extinguished any possibility in this regard and forced Rohingya activists and armed 
movements to go underground (Chan, 2005, p. 36). “When elections were held under the 
1974 Constitution the Bengali Muslims from the Mayu Frontier Area were denied the right 
to elect their representatives to the “Pyithu Hlut-taw” (People‟s Congress)” (Chan, 2005, p. 
36).  
 Conditions for the Rohingya community were definitively worsened when a 
Citizenship Law was enacted in 1982. Although the Burmese government argued that the 
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Law derived from the necessity to tackle irregular and illegal immigration up to 1978 
(Rakhine Inquiry Commission, 2013, p. 5), the Law “allowed only the ethnic groups who 
had lived in Burma before the First Anglo-Burmese War began in 1824 as the citizens of 
the country. By this law those Muslims had been treated as aliens in the land they have 
inhabited for more than a century” (Chan, 2005, p. 36). Since then, the Rohingya have 
been “stripped of equal access to citizenship” and rendered stateless (Landis, 2014, p. 16). 
It is estimated that, currently, only 40.000 Rohingya have citizenship (Landis, 2014, p. 16). 
In 1992, the ruling State and Law Order and Restoration Council, the name under which 
the central Government in Myanmar functioned, manifested its unwillingness to recognize 
the Rohingya as citizens:  
“Although there are 135 national races living in Myanmar today, the so called the 
Rohingya people is not one of them. Historically, there has never been a Rohinger 
race in Myanmar. People of Muslim faith from the adjacent country illegally 
entered into Myanmar Naingan particular the Rakhine State.” (Zan, 2005, p. 8) 
 Several decades passed by and the citizenship issue of the Rohingya received no 
solution. Although the government in Myanmar has put democratic reforms in place since 
2010, to lift the country from a decades-long isolation, the pressure from international 
actors regarding ongoing human rights violations in its territory seems insufficient. For 
now, “There are no discernable changes underway to create such a pathway [for Rohingya 
citizenship] let alone provide equal access to full citizenship rights for Rohingya” (Landis, 
2014, p. 16).  
 According to the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights 
in Myanmar, Tomás Ojea Quintana, there are some advances in Myanmar in regards to 
human rights that contrast with the lack of progress in the situation in Rakhine State 
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(United Nations, 2014, p. 11). The right to life of the Muslim population is threatened by 
several prohibitions and restrictions. In the capital of Rakhine State, Sittwe, Aung 
Mingalar remains as the last neighborhood were Muslim people live, described by 
Quintana as a ghetto. According to his report, there is a decrease in the population which is 
evident after eight months since the Rapporteur‟s last visit. “Residents are still prevented 
from leaving the quarter by armed guards and wire fencing, and are reliant on food being 
delivered from a nearby market” (United Nations, 2014, p. 11). Furthermore, medical 
assistance is highly limited, as there is only one medical assistant for all 4.735 residents in 
the guard. The Report describes this situation as a “microcosm” of what is currently 
happening in several internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in Rakhine State, where the 
right to freedom of movement and the right to education are restricted and where places of 
worship are violated (United Nations, 2014, p. 11). 
There are documents which suggest the discomfort of the government with an 
alleged increase in the population of the Rohingya. Government officials argue there is an 
“extremely rapid growth rate of the Bengali [Rohingya] population in Rakhine State” 
which contributes to instability, “fear and insecurity amongst the Rakhine people”. In their 
opinion, “the growth was not only due to high birth rates, but also to a steady increase of 
illegal immigration from neighboring Bangladesh” (Landis, 2014, p. 20). The measures to 
counter the birth of new babies in the detention camps where Rohingya are forced to live 
cause violations as “enforced birth control, coercive limits on childbirth, restrictions on 
marriage and private relationships, and restrictions on movement”, all contained and 
explained in a report entitled Regional Order 1/2005 (Landis, 2014, p. 22). It is necessary 
to further note that these policies are believed to have been in force for already nine years 
(Landis, 2014, p. 24). Furthermore, the National Census being carried out this month 
14 
 
 
excludes those who identify themselves as Rohingya from the national registry, protracting 
the citizenship conflict the Rohingya are going through. 
The organism entitled to guarantee the promotion of human rights within the 
territory of ASEAN is the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 
(AICHR), created in 2009 with several limitations. Its „Intergovernmental‟ character keeps 
it accountable to governments and hinders its independence (Petcharamesree, 2013, p. 50). 
However, surely the main limitation the AICHR relies in the provisions of the Terms of 
Reference (TOC), a document that monitors the AICHR functioning and defines its 
actions. The TOC grants the AICHR consultative functions but do not grant it monitoring 
or investigative capacities, necessary for a comprehensive promotion and defense of 
human rights and a characteristic of the Regional Human Rights Systems in the Americas 
and Europe (ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, 2009). 
The lack of coercive capacities of AICHR – and the limited political willingness of 
Members of ASEAN as Myanmar to respect and adhere themselves to international human 
rights instruments– prevents any change with the human rights violations based on identity 
that Rohingya are suffering. Therefore, this dissertation paper poses the following research 
question: “Are weak enforcing capacities of human rights regimes effective in order for 
states to comply with international human rights norms? The hypothesis the dissertation 
paper develops is “human rights regimes‟ weak enforcement capacities are not effective 
when coercing States to comply with international human rights norms”. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 For the development of this dissertation paper, several terms have to be understood 
and defined during this section. 
 
Compliance with regimes 
To understand state compliance international human rights regimes, we must firstly 
revise relevant literature concerning regime theory. Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986) give a 
widely accepted definition of “regime”, as “governing arrangements constructed by states 
to coordinate their expectations and organize aspects of international behavior in various 
issue-areas” (Kratochwil & Ruggie, 1986, p. 759). The authors add that regimes are shaped 
and composed by normative elements, state practice, and are structured with organizational 
roles (Kratochwil & Ruggie, 1986, p. 759). Koh (1998) defines regimes as “governing 
arrangements in which certain governing norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
come to predominate because the nations in their long- term self-interests have calculated 
that they should follow a presumption favoring compliance with such rules” (Koh, 1999, p. 
1397). 
Obligation is defined by Keohane and Abott (2000) as one of the core components 
of the concept of Legalization (Abott & Keohane, 2000, p. 17). Firstly, Legalization is “a 
particular form of institutionalization” defined in terms of “key characteristics of rules and 
procedures” composed by the elements of Obligation, Precision and Delegation (Abott & 
Keohane, 2000, p. 17). Obligation is, then, defined as when “states or other actors are 
bound by a rule or commitment or by a set of rules or commitments in the sense that their 
behavior thereunder is subject to scrutiny under the general rules, procedures, and 
discourse of international law, and often of domestic law as well” (Abott & Keohane, 
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2000, p. 17). Obligations are shaped by precision or ambiguousness and this defines the 
degree of compliance to international norms and the effectiveness of normative 
mechanisms. Keohane and Abott define „Precision‟ as how “rules unambiguously define 
the conduct they require, authorize or proscribe” (Abott & Keohane, 2000, p. 17). For our 
analysis, the AICHR is recognized as the main actor –besides States themselves– which 
can help solve the situation of the Rohingya. Keohane and Abott define this role as 
Delegation, or how “third parties have been granted authority to implement, interpret, and 
apply the rules; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules (Abott & 
Keohane, 2000, p. 17). 
These authors mention that obligations to which States are subject in regimes can 
fluctuate between the extreme of binding and non-binding. And, in some cases not 
surprisingly, its actors the ones which utilize techniques to define how obligations 
fluctuate. According to the authors, there are weaknesses regarding the effectiveness of 
regimes and this creates “surprising contrasts between form and substance”, as “it is 
widely accepted that states expect some formally binding “political treaties” not to be 
observed if interests or circumstances change” (Abott & Keohane, 2000, p. 17). In benefits 
of States, treaties can be composed of ambiguous wording, to avoid or “circumscribe their 
obligatory force”. Contingent obligations is another resources that states utilize in order to 
–unintentionally– weaken the strength of their obligations, as they are encouraged to take 
stapes to obtain an outcome, as gradually reducing gas emissions, but by providing them 
the chance to consider "their specific national and regional development priorities, 
objectives, and circumstances" (Abott & Keohane, 2000, p. 17). Commitments enshrined 
in ambiguously-worded treaties can include hortatory commitments, which “encourage” or 
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“exhort” countries to comply with provisions. As well, they can include escape clauses, 
which make the compliance process far more complex (Abott & Keohane, 2000, p. 17). 
Ambiguous is avoided through the introduction of precise standards. This term, 
precision, is defined by Abott and Keohane (2000) as a process of “narrowing the scope 
for reasonable interpretation”, implying “not just that each rule in the set is unambiguous, 
but that the rules are related to one another in a non-contradictory way, creating a 
framework within which case-by-case interpretation can be coherently carried out (Abott 
& Keohane, 2000, p. 29). They define precise norms as “highly elaborated or dense, 
detailing conditions of application, spelling out required or proscribed behavior in 
numerous situations” (Abott & Keohane, 2000, p. 29). From these definitions we can 
deduce that the cohesiveness and solidity of norms within any regime ensure their 
effectiveness. 
The explanations of state obedience to regimes and, more specifically, to 
international legal norms, Koh finds several explanations basing on international relations 
theory. He finds that Relists believe in obedience based on power (Koh, 1999, p. 1396), 
this is, “the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities 
of actors to determine their circumstances and fate” (Duvall & Barnett, 2005, p. 42). Along 
with power, realists recognize the uncertainty that the belonging to a regime can cause in 
composing Members. Mearsheimer argues that “states fear each other [and] can never be 
certain about the intentions of other states”. That is how cheating cam become a tactic of 
defense regardless of the normative framework of a regime, “as intentions can change 
quickly” and there is low possibility of determining and preventing them (Mearsheimer, 
1995, p. 10). 
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Following the rational choice precepts, Koh argues that nations may put prevalence 
on their self-interest rather than choosing randomly global rules to follow. Thus they will 
choose those that represent more precisely their interests (Duvall & Barnett, 2005, p. 42). 
This rational-choice view is coherent with the arguments of Linton (2009), who argues that 
“international human rights agreements are only enforced when they serve the political 
purposes of enforcing states”. For authoritarian regimes that avoid enforcement, however, 
entering treaties can mean political survival. Through this process, they can “relieve the 
pressures from fellow states, from influential supranational political entities, from their 
communities” and non-state actors as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Linton, 
2008, p. 442). According to Linton, the regional context in which States find themselves 
can exercise an influential role regarding how international norms are enforced through the 
primacy of economic and political interdependence. These elements “generate greater 
external pressure on countries to exhibit a commitment to human rights norms" (Linton, 
2008, p. 442).  
We can thus deduce that certain States, especially authoritarian regimes which 
constantly violate human rights, regard international human rights treaties as coercive and 
challenging, and may be exceptionally willing to ratify them in times of crisis or as a way 
to attract international aid from foreign donors (Linton, 2008, p. 452). Linton, precisely, 
considers the nature of human rights treaties as “intrusive” and describe them as “the most 
highly reserved category of treaties” (Linton, 2008, p. 452). For states fitting in that 
description, reservations have been created as a mechanism to ensure participation in 
international treaties. This, however, usually hinder the scope, effectiveness and coercive 
character of treaties (Linton, 2008, p. 452).  
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Sovereignty 
At this point, it is appropriate to consider the analysis of the balance between 
sovereignty and human rights. Pauly and Grande mention that sovereignty is part of the 
structure of Max Weber‟s „modern state‟, and coexists with territoriality, rational 
legitimacy and bureaucratic institutionalization (Pauly & Grande, 2007, p. 8). Both authors 
mention the two levels that define sovereignty: the internal aspect, dealing with the “state‟s 
autonomy from society”, and the external level, dealing with the “state‟s independence 
from other states” (Pauly & Grande, 2007, p. 11). They argue that, although both levels 
develop separately, they remain interdependent.  
Although Pauly and Grande write that “sovereignty concentrates legitimate 
coercive powers within a society in the hands of public authorities”, hindering the 
participation of individuals and organizations in this “coercion process”, they both 
recognize the gradual strengthening of international regimes and organizations in the last 
decades, reflected in the emergence of new policy-making and decision-making regimes, 
the consolidation of new ways of interstate cooperation and the progressive importance of 
private and non-state actors and their interaction with public actors (Pauly & Grande, 2007, 
p. 15).  
To Clunan (2009), “human rights are seen as a critical challenge to state 
sovereignty, as they challenge its central premise of the state as the ultimate legal and 
political authority in world politics” (Clunan, 2009, p. 7). This author exposes two ways in 
which human rights have challenged state sovereignty. Firstly, the universality of certain 
human rights challenges the notion of absolute internal state sovereignty and increases 
accountability. Clunan calls this “contingent sovereignty”, or the responsibility sovereignty 
entails in regards to a country‟s treatment of its population. Second, the role of individuals 
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has changed in time, allowing them to act and confront states through a legal personality 
(Clunan, 2009, p. 9). This creates momentum in which, through the participation of civil 
society and non-state actors, compliance with treaties and their enforcement can become 
tighter.  
Enforcement, as argued by Koh (1998), can occur through a horizontal process and 
a vertical process. In the horizontal process, the main enforcers of human rights law have 
been nation-states, “interacting with one another on an interstate, government-to-
government level” (Koh, 1999, p. 1408). With the development of regional institutions, 
especially regional human rights systems, other actors became integrated in this process 
and participated, as several U.N. organizations, the Human Rights Commission or the 
Human Rights Committee (Koh, 1999, p. 1408). However, Clunan argues that the 
mechanism for enforcement in this horizontal process remained lenient and ineffective. On 
the other hand, the vertical process benefited from transnational exchanges and came to 
include several actors as enforcing agents such as public figures, “transnational norm 
entrepreneurs” and international organizations (Koh, 1999, p. 1409).  
 
Rohingya vs. Bengali 
It is necessary to define who the Rogingya is and which the problem with their 
citizenship issue is. However, as will be explained throughout this work, the historical 
origin of this people is still debated.  
Rakhine State, bordering Bangladesh, is majorly composed by the Rohingya 
Muslims and the Rakhine Buddhist –the latter being the one recognized by the 
government. There are currently diverging views regarding the origin of the Rohingya 
people in today‟s Rakhine State, the former territory of Arakan, which today borders 
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Bangladesh. Siddiqui (2008) states, firstly, that the term „Rohingya‟ derives from the 
ancient name of Arakan, „Rohang‟. He further recognizes several influxes of Muslims to 
the territory which today is Myanmar. He writes that “the first Muslims to settle the 
Arakan were Arabs under the leadership of Muhammad ibn Hanafiya in the late 7th 
century” (Siddiqui, 2008). He argues the second influx of Muslims in today‟s Rakhine 
State occurred as ships were wrecked in the Ramree Island during the twenty years of 
Mahataing Sandya‟s reign since 788 AD.  
The crews of the wrecked ships were composed by Moor Arab Muslims who were 
“sent to Arakan proper and settled in villages” (Siddiqui, 2008). Siddiqui adds that 
subsequent ethnic groups mixed with these Muslims as they started to move into the 
territory (Siddiqui, 2008), and these mixtures characterize today‟s Rohingya, which are 
“Muslims by religion with distinct culture and civilization of its own” (Siddiqui, 2008).  
On the other hand, authors like Aye Chan (2005) question the antiquity of the term 
Rohingya and argues it is actually a term coined in the 1950s, with no historical evidence 
in any language before then (Chan, 2005, p. 18). Although he recognizes the existence of a 
Muslim community in Arakan before the State was ceded to British India in 1826 (Chan, 
2005, p. 18), he claims that “the creators of the term might have been from the second or 
third generations of the Bengali immigrants from the Chittagong District”, in today‟s 
Bangladesh (Chan, 2005, p. 18). Contradicting the facts exposed by Siddiqui (2008), U 
Shwe Zan (2005) dismisses the possibility of a conquest of “Mohammedan” –Muslims– 
citizens of Arakan but acknowledges the presence of them at some points in history. 
Firstly, the author recognizes Muslim arrivals during the 8th century, after Arabs, Moors 
and Persians shipwrecked in the coast. Another influx occurred in AD 1428, when 
followers of the Sultan of Gaur were allowed to settle around the Laungret area, in today‟s 
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Rakhine. The third moment U Shwe Zan mentions is the end of the expeditions of King 
Min Bin to some Bengal provinces, in today‟s Bangladesh (Zan, 2005, p. 9). He returned 
with prisoners and allowed them to settle in the area around the city of Mrauk-U (Zan, 
2005, p. 9). 
 Most of the historical accounts support Zan‟s argument about the role Britain had in 
the demographics of the region after the first Anglo-Burmese war in 1824 and the 
annexation of Arakan to British India in 1826 (Seekings, 2006, p. 71). Establishing an 
open-door policy for foreign workers in Arakan State was conceived at a moment when 
exploiting and harvesting the resources of Rakhine land became a priority for the British, 
as agricultural laborers were scarce (Zan, 2005, p. 10). At first, foreign labor used to return 
home but started to settle in townships as “Maungdaw, Buthidaung, Rathedaung and 
Sittwe”. Chan (2005) mentions that during the colonial rule the Chittagonian immigrants 
(in reference to the city of Chittagong, in Bangladesh) became the largest ethnic group in 
the Mayu Frontier, an area that composes today‟s Rakhine State, near the Mayu River 
(Chan, 2005, p. 25). Cheng (1968) argues that immigration from India was assisted and 
unassisted by the British Government (Cheng, 1968).  
“India was populated by millions of people who were unemployed or 
underemployed. The British Government turned its attention to this vas reservoir of labor 
and decided to intervene actively to promote the migration of people, preferably 
cultivators, from India to Burma for it was thought to be of mutual advantage to relieve the 
congestion of the more densely populated and poverty-stricken districts of India, especially 
in times of famine, and to introduce new crops, new methods of cultivation and the much 
needed population into Burma” (Cheng, 1968, p. 118).  
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Cheng (1968) adds that almost all of the Indian immigrants under this scheme had 
the intention to earn as much money they could in Burma and return home, challenging the 
plans of the Indian and Burmese Administrations, which wished to “bring some relief to 
the densely-populated districts of India” (the former) and set up Indian agricultural 
colonies in Lower Burma (the latter) (Cheng, 1968, p. 119). However, the assisted 
immigration, which brought altogether 8.500 Indians inside today‟s Myanmar (Cheng, 
1968, p. 120), was eclipsed by the flow of immigrants which entered unassisted, in a ratio 
of 15.000 per year in average during the 1870‟s (Cheng, 1968, p. 120). 
Zan (2005) argues that immigration (he calls it „infiltration‟) of Bengali Muslims 
continued in the 1930s, occupying several posts in the Government services (Zan, 2005, p. 
12). As clashes developed in Arakan State since the 1930s (International Crisis Group, 
2013, p. 3), the controversy about the citizenship of the Rohingya continued during the 
20th century. Today, the term „Bengali‟ is used by the government implying they are 
illegal immigrants, in spite of the facts that hundreds argue they have lived in Myanmar for 
generations (Mooney, 2014). This is one of the main controversy points regarding the 2014 
Myanmar National Census, which prohibits the term Rohingya for being used, excluding 
from the registries all those who define themselves as Rohingya. This perpetuates the 
denial of the existence of the Rohingya community in Myanmar and reproduces the human 
rights violations based on identity which currently are going on (Mooney, 2014). 
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METHODOLOGY 
For the development of this dissertation paper, I will use three variables. The 
independent variable will be the effectiveness of the enforcing capacities of human rights 
regimes, illustrated with the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 
(AICHR).  
The dependent variable will be states‟ compliance with the norms of this kind of 
regimes, illustrated with the human rights violations suffered by the Rohingya community 
in Myanmar and their future prospects. In order to analyze it, we must first recall that, as 
authors have argued throughout this paper, unambiguous and precise treaty provisions 
ensure regime effectiveness. In order to achieve state compliance to international treaties 
and regimes, hard laws are necessary (Hafner-Burton, 2005, p. 594). For our analysis, we 
will take into account the treaty ratifications and the international legal obligations of 
Myanmar, as well as its Constitution, entered into force in 2008. As well, the impact of 
some democratic reforms introduced by Myanmar since 2010 will be analyzed. This will 
be done in order to foresee the prospects for the improvement of the human rights 
conditions of the Rohingya community in Myanmar.  
As a control variable, I will utilize the concept of sovereignty and cultural values 
opposed to universalism, illustrated by cultural norms and conceptions to which several 
Asian countries hold and which shape ASEAN‟s interstate interactions, expressed in their 
preference for economic, social and cultural rights over civil and political rights. These 
values are known as „Asian values‟. 
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ANALYSIS 
As the overarching institution within ASEAN in charge of the promotion of human 
rights, the AICHR still faces several limitations. As it was mentioned before, the document 
which regulates the functioning of ASEAN, the ASEAN Charter came into force in 
December 2008 (Petcharamesree, 2013, p. 50). The inclusion of the concepts “fundamental 
freedoms” and “human rights” in the Charter‟s body initially represented a “turning point”, 
as it seemed that the organization was finally considering a more comprehensive 
application of universal human rights standards through the Charter‟s regulative capacities 
rather than just nominally recognizing the importance of both concepts, as it had done 
before. However, a lack of precision in the wording of the article hindered the creation of a 
solid mechanism of protection and promotion of human rights. Article 14 of the Charter 
states that: 
1. In conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter relating to 
the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, ASEAN 
shall establish an ASEAN human rights body [the AICHR]. 
2. This ASEAN human rights body [the AICHR] shall operate in accordance with the 
terms of reference to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting. 
In line with Petcharamesree, the creation of a „body‟ represented a gridlock in the 
advancements towards a solid mechanism for the promotion and protection of human 
rights. The designation as a „body‟ lacked specificity, but it became a Commission in 2009, 
for its inauguration. Another problem is that the Commission, by being intergovernmental, 
is kept accountable to the governments which send representatives to it (Petcharamesree, 
2013, p. 50). In the case of Myanmar, its representative is Mr. Kyaw Tint Swe, the former 
military junta‟s permanent representative to the United Nations, a career diplomat who 
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constantly denied the junta‟s human rights violations and described them as mere 
“misinformation campaigns”, including the Depayin massacre in 2003 (Asian Forum for 
Human Rights and Development, 2013, p. 3). Kyaw Tint Swe is currently the vice-chair of 
Myanmar‟s National Human Rights Commission, an organism which has been repeatedly 
criticized of not abiding by the Paris Principles (Asian Forum for Human Rights and 
Development, 2013, p. 4). 
Among its functions, the AICHR is entitled to submit human rights thematic 
studies and reports on its activities to ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meetings (ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, 2009). As it remains accountable to 
governments, its work and its independence is likely to suffer from political pressure and 
be hindered by political interest. This is already evident in how AICHR meetings are held 
in total secrecy, excluding civil society actors. According to a report on the first three years 
of functioning of the AICHR, the Commission “did not announce or publish in advance the 
agenda of any of their various official meetings and other activities held in 2012 (Asian 
Forum for Human Rights and Development, 2013, p. 7).  
Another shortcoming of the AICHR, which goes in line with the previous 
commentary, is the Commission‟s subjection to its Terms of Reference (TOC). This 
document, which describes the whole functioning of the AICHR, allows the Commission 
to exercise consultative functions but it forbids monitoring or investigative endeavors 
(ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, 2009). There are already 
cases waiting to be investigated, as the forced disappearance of Laotian development 
activist Sombath Somphone, which has not produced any result (Human Rights Watch, 
2013).  
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However, there are more pressing issues that come into question with our analysis 
objectives. The AICHR adoption and acceptance of principles enshrined in the ASEAN 
Human Rights Declaration is concerning as they emphasize the respect for sovereignty for 
States and the recognition of specific circumstances in which compliance to international 
norms is considered. It is pertinent to mention that the Declaration, beyond being too 
lenient and protective of issues regarding sovereignty and non-interference, was composed 
by governments‟ appointed delegates (Petcharamesree, 2013, p. 52). This is, maybe, one of 
the main critiques points when analyzing regime effectiveness: the lack of solid principles 
and the lack of transparency and independence. 
As well, the AICHR lacks any coercive mechanism for the adherence of Member 
States‟ to international human rights instruments. Among its mandates and functions, the 
AICHR promotes the Members‟ cooperation to implement the instruments to which they 
are Parties and, in a clear display of its limited role, it does not go beyond encouraging 
them to adhere themselves to new human rights instruments (ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights, 2009).  
There is no information available on how the AICHR efforts to encourage ASEAN 
Member States to consider acceding to and ratifying international human rights 
instruments. The Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development published that 
information regarding three activities for this end were not published and there is no 
evidence of results. The activities included “completing a stocktaking of existing human 
rights instruments acceded and ratified by ASEAN Member States”; “identifying priority 
for accession and ratification of international human rights instruments for ASEAN 
Member States”; “On request of the ASEAN Member State concerned, providing 
necessary assistance to facilitate the accession and ratification of  international human 
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rights instruments (Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, 2013, p. 22). If this 
kind of efforts are underfunded and remain unknown to civil society they are likely to fail. 
As we see in Table 1, Myanmar has not signed or ratified any document of the 
International Bill of Human Rights besides the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
With the enforcing capacities of the AICHR, this situation will not change (University of 
Minnesota Human Rights Library). 
TABLE 1 
Title Signature Ratification Accession 
International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights 
- - - 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 
- - - 
Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
- - - 
Second Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
aiming at the abolition of the death penalty 
- - - 
Table 1: Retrieved from the University of Minnesota Human Rights Library 
It must be accordingly added that international treaty ratification goes hand in hand 
with coherent domestic policies. However, the legal scenario in Myanmar is challenging to 
any reform to occur. Pedersen (2010) argues that the military maintains a dominant role in 
politics, directly receiving 25% of seats in parliament for serving military officers and 
controlling the National Defence and Security Council. The military, which remains 
autonomous and “subject to neither executive, legislative nor judicial civilian authority”, 
could suppress democratic rights at any moment, providing that laws are enacted for 
“Union security, prevalence of law and order” (Pedersen, 2010). Although Constitution 
reforms have been analyzed to, among other things, allow “any citizen” to become 
president, in reference to nobel laurate Aung San Suu Kyi, no reform is mentioned in 
regards to citizenship issues or the 1982 Citizenship Law in force. The Constitution, in its 
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Chapter VIII, grants „citizens‟ several benefits and rights, as equal rights without 
discrimination, equal rights and access before the law, liberty to reside upon free decision 
among others (Amnesty International). However, this Chapter manipulates the concept of 
citizen and ensures it keeps the status quo. It establishes: 
1. All persons who have either one of the following requirements are citizens of the 
Union of Myanmar: 
(a) All persons born of parents both of whom are nationals of the Union of 
Myanmar. 
(b) Persons who are vested with citizenship according to the existing laws 
on the date this Constitution comes into force. 
2. Citizenship, naturalization and revocation of citizenship shall be as prescribed by 
the law (Amnesty International). 
In regards to other institutions promoting or protecting human rights within the 
scope of ASEAN, neither the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on the Protection of 
the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC) nor the ASEAN Committee on the 
Implementation of the ASEAN Declaration of the Protection of the Rights of Migrant 
Workers have monitoring or investigation powers (Petcharamesree, 2013, p. 50). They are 
expected to promote –and not to protect– human rights, regardless of their nature 
(Petcharamesree, 2013, p. 50). 
As it was mentioned before, Article 14 of the Charter faced obstacles, mainly the 
lack of evident political willingness of ASEAN Members for embracing both concepts and, 
rather, balancing them with the principle of non-interference in their internal affairs. This 
is enshrined in the Charter‟s second Article, “Principles”: 
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2.2. ASEAN and its Member States shall act in accordance with the following 
Principles: 
(a) respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and 
national identity of all ASEAN Member States; 
(e) non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN Member States; 
(f) respect for the right of every Member State to lead its national existence free 
from external interference, subversion and coercion; (Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations, 2008) 
Petcharamesree claims that “ASEAN views human rights as an internal affair” 
(Petcharamesree, 2013, p. 55), rejecting the idea of universality and, instead, promoting 
diversity over international human rights standards and practices with those of each 
country (Petcharamesree, 2013, p. 56). Authors as Freeman explain this as a kind of 
rebellion against the West, as a way of canalizing resentments against colonial and 
neocolonial domination (Freeman, 2005, p. 46). Furthermore, Petcharamesree argues that 
some countries in this region prioritize the achievement of economic, social and cultural 
rights in contrast to their efforts regarding civic and political rights (Petcharamesree, 2013, 
p. 56). 
This is one of the components of what is known as the „Asian values‟ argument, 
which explains the view of some Asian governments in regards to their promotion of 
human rights. One of its main proponents, Singapore, promoted prioritizing “responsibility 
of the individual to the society and the role of the family” and the duties to the community 
over the benefits of individual rights,  granting prevalence to the Asian concept of 
„familiarity‟ against the „individuality‟ of the West (International Bar Association Human 
Rights Institute, 2008, p. 17). Furthermore, “cooperation is purportedly preferred over 
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coercion and trust in the authority and dominance of state leaders is expected” 
(International Bar Association Human Rights Institute, 2008, p. 17). In 2008, Singapore 
claimed: 
„It is best to conceive of rights as those norms and values that enable societies to 
progress and individuals to have opportunities to develop their potential to the best 
of their abilities. In Singapore, our growth and prosperity over the years have, 
through judicious planning, careful management and sound investments, translated 
into progress in Singaporeans‟ well-being in terms of life expectancy, adult literacy 
rate, prevalence of criminality, and access to clean water, sanitation and health 
services. The Singapore Government remains committed to ensuring a high degree 
of peace, freedom, prosperity and personal security for all Singaporeans. The 
Government also pays special attention to the protection and welfare of vulnerable 
or special groups‟ (International Bar Association Human Rights Institute, 2008, p. 
17). 
Petcharamesree adds that several ASEAN governments would prefer sacrificing the 
individual freedoms for the sake of the whole population, that “individual rights must give 
way to the demands of national security and economic growth” (Petcharamesree, 2013, p. 
56). This is one of the supports of the „Asian values‟ argument: it justifies the precedence 
of economic, social and cultural rights over civic and political ones under certain 
circumstances to “enable economic growth and social cohesion (International Bar 
Association Human Rights Institute, 2008, p. 17). Katanyuu (2006) supports these 
definitions and explains that the principle of non-interference in the region was motivated 
by interstate conflicts between the Association Members‟ as well as by subversive groups 
promoting destabilization or secession (Katanyuu, 2006, p. 827). The case of Myanmar is 
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illustrative, as the country is ethnically multi-diverse with around 135 recognized ethnic 
groups which have south autonomy since independence and which have protracted an 
ethnic conflict against the central government (Smith, 2007, p. 8).  
The principle, explained by Katanyuu, has established three codes of conduct for 
intergovernmental relations within ASEAN. It firstly discourages Member States from 
criticizing or encroaching themselves in the internal affairs of their peer Members 
(Katanyuu, 2006, p. 826). This aspect can, clearly, undermine the activities and capacities 
of the AICHR, as all negotiations between ASEAN Members are developed following 
non-confrontational and consensual negotiations, this is, no measurable pressure can be 
exercised. It also promotes the commitment amongst Member States to avoid granting a 
safe haven to subversive groups trying to destabilize the neighboring country (Katanyuu, 
2006, p. 826). Finally, it promotes the commitment amongst Members not to give 
assistance to external powers which could affect or threaten neighboring countries –which 
was particularly important during the Cold War (Katanyuu, 2006, p. 826). This principle, it 
so seems, still remains one of the cornerstones of the interstate functioning of ASEAN and, 
consequently, would challenge the efforts of a well-versed human rights commission 
towards the protection of human rights in the region. 
It is pertinent to mention that some authors consider that the debate over Asian 
values has finally been closed. Pföstl (2008), for instance, recalls how challenging had 
Myanmar been before its turn to hold the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2006, prompting 
discussion about its expulsion from the Association. In this regard, the author claims that 
“the structural conflict between Asian identity and human rights, such as prospected by the 
original Asian values debate, has been in some way overcome and transformed” (Pföstl, 
2008, p. 46). Pföstl explanation to their decline is the desire of countries in the region to 
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rebuild their post-colonial collective identity and, for this end, respecting human rights and 
protecting democracy became necessary ” (Pföstl, 2008, p. 46).  
On the other hand, however, there is the conviction that the analysis of Asian 
values, as a specific expression of cultural relativism, is still valid. Brunn and Jacobsen 
(2003) focus on the content of the Bangkok Declaration on human rights, whose 
ambivalent wording embraces the notion that some human rights are universal while 
preaches the importance of sovereignty and the historical, cultural  and religious 
background of Members which abide by it (Jacobsen & Brunn, 2003). Two of the 
principles enshrined in the body of the declaration illustrate this point: 
5. Emphasize the principles of respect for national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity as well as non-interference in the internal affairs of States, and the non-use 
of human rights as an instrument of political pressure. 
8. Recognize that while human rights are universal in nature, they must be 
considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-
setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and 
various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds. 
 Although it was drafted in 1993, amid the enthusiasm produced by the Vienna 
Declaration and Program of Action of the same year, the ASEAN Charter and the human 
rights system of the organization base their provisions for the respect and promotion on 
human rights directly on the same principles. The „Asian values‟ argument is an issue that 
pertains to the Asian continent; however, the notion and debate of sovereignty against 
collectively established values remains pertinent. 
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CONCLUSION 
The plight of the Rohingya today relies on the unwillingness of the government of 
Myanmar to reform the 1982 Citizenship Law. When it entered into force, its provisions 
provided citizenship to who had lived in Myanmar before the First Aglo-Burmese War in 
1824. Since then, the Rohingya have remained stateless and face serious human rights 
violations which are based on the identity they hold: if they describe themselves as 
Rohingyas, for example, they will not be included in the 2014 Myanmar´s National Census 
registries, as the term is not considered to be a legal community in the country. Instead, 
they are portrayed as Bengalis, which collaborates with the government‟s argument of the 
illegality of the term „Rohingya‟ and does not solve the problem but just accentuates it. It 
has been reported, as well, that many Rohingya have described themselves as Bengalis 
because of the implications and risks that would entail (Mooney, 2014).  
 It is already known that the human rights violations which this community is 
suffering threaten basic human rights as life and access to health. Media report the 
situation in IDP camps where Rohingya remain interned has become a humanitarian 
emergency, as humanitarian aid organizations have been denied access or ransacked and 
forced to leave the country. Not only has the government participated in this campaign, 
which has restricted the operations of such organizations as Doctors Without Borders, but 
also local Buddhist officials, which embrace a fervent nationalist sentiment, the same 
sentiment responsible for violence documented in the past. For now, the violations of 
human rights of the Rohingya are not limited to the cut off of humanitarian aid, which 
allows one doctor to several thousands of Rohingya. Freedom of movement and residence 
is also restricted, as “tight security prevents people from leaving, even to work” (Perlez, 
2014). As well, discomfort amongst government officials regarding the birth rate of the 
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Rohingya community prompted the introduction of a Two-Child Policy, which is in force 
and affects the Rohingya rights to family and life (Perlez, 2014). 
 As was discussed before, violence against the Rohingya is not a new phenomenon. 
Historical accounts differ on the exact time when Muslims arrived to what is now 
Myanmar. Accounts agree on the fact that the opening of the Suez Canal simplified and 
developed trade, bringing merchants and ships to the Bay of Bengal. Accounts as that of 
Cheng (1968) document the dynamism of the rice trade, a product which was abundant in 
today‟s Myanmar but lacked the labor. As shipwrecks in the coast brought new men and 
women to the coast, immigration sponsored by the British government from India into 
British Burma brought large inflows of labor –especially illegal labor. As immigrants 
occupied job posts, tensions arose and a nationalist sentiment became rife, fueled by the 
desires of independence. The accounts mentioned in this dissertation paper put emphasis 
on the violence perpetrated in the 1930s, years before independence, when discontent over 
Buddhist and Muslim intermarriage became evident, although new normative allowed it. 
 Violence during the following years forced Rohingya activism to go underground 
or flee to neighboring countries, particularly due to government-sponsored violence 
campaigns. The official argument, which motivated the adoption of the 1982 Citizenship 
Law, was the need for regulation and combat of illegal immigration. However, the 
consequences of such policy, which has endured for decades, are still visible now. 
 The role of regional organizations, of contributing to the solution of internal 
conflicts in their Members‟ territories, depends on several factors. It must be remembered, 
however, that authors as Pauly and Grande recognize the emergence of international 
organization as an important aspect to bear in mind, as it has become an important modus 
of decision- and policy-making, beyond the reach of individual States.  
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 As was analyzed, regimes may pose challenges to the sovereignty of States. A 
regime, defined by Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986) as “governing arrangements constructed 
by states to coordinate their expectations and organize aspects of international behavior in 
various issue-areas”, find stability when compliance with rules and predictable behaviors 
can be ensured. Furthermore, Abott and Keohane argue that aspects as obligation, 
precision and delegation, play a fundamental role when defining a regime‟s solidity and 
compose the concept of „Legalization‟. Obligation, defined as “States‟s or other actors 
commitment with set of rules or commitments in the sense that their behavior thereunder is 
subject to scrutiny under the general rules, procedures, and discourse of international law”, 
is defined by written norms contained in constitutive documents. When norms and 
regulations are more precise, as Abott and Keohane argue, obligations will be respected 
and the regime‟s stability may be guaranteed. The control and monitoring functions within 
a regime according to Abott and Keohane, is developed by a third party, what the authors 
call „delegation‟. It seems simple.  
 However, the nature of human rights obligations is considered to be intrusive by 
authors as Clunan. As they have increased the accountability of governments to the 
international community, based on the universality of several human rights, they pose an 
obstacle to a country‟s free policy exercise. As well, the activism of individuals and their 
holding of legal personality further ensure Clunan‟s „contingent sovereignty‟, or the 
responsibility sovereignty entails in regards to a country‟s treatment of its population. 
 The coercive reach of treaties can be, however, circumscribed or undermined 
through several techniques, which are mentioned by Abott and Keohane. These include 
ambiguous wording, escape clauses, ignoring treaties if circumstances change, hortatory 
commitments and contingent obligations. The last one of these techniques is the main 
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reason why the institution analyzed in the case study of this dissertation paper shows poor 
prospects of effectiveness regarding the promotion and protection of human rights. 
 As was assessed, The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, 
which is entitled by its Guidelines to promote and protect human rights within the ASEAN 
region, lacks the capacities a solid and effective regime needs in order to enforce 
compliance with norms, in this case, international human rights treaties. As its character is 
Intergovernmental, its independence is undermined and it is subject to experience political 
pressures. For instance, the Commission‟s budget is controlled so that it does not receive 
funding from sources which are not ASEAN Members, to ensure it does not develop a 
parallel agenda. As well, in the case of Myanmar, the Representative appointed to the 
Commission guards links to the extinct military junta‟s poor human rights records. 
 However, most importantly, it is necessary to mention that the AICHR is limited by 
the ambiguous and modest wording of its Terms of Reference (TOC), which prevents the 
Commission from developing any monitoring or investigative efforts. An example, which 
has been denounced by human rights organizations, is the forced disappearance of Laotian 
development activist Sombath Somphone years ago, which has not received any solution to 
the moment. Furthermore, the AICHR guards excessive relation with provisions enshrined 
in the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the Bangkok Declaration of 1993, which 
emphasize the “respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as non-
interference in the internal affairs of States, and the non-use of human rights as an 
instrument of political pressure”, as well as giving primacy to “national and regional 
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds”, though 
recognizing the universality of human rights. 
38 
 
 
 The respect of such principles as sovereignty and nations‟ values is reflected in an 
argument that, for some authors, has been overcome and is obsolete but that, for others, is 
the clear representation of cultural relativism, excluding the universality of some human 
rights. Asian values, which were originated as a rebellious response to the West “colonial 
or neo-colonial” interpretation of human rights, promote the “responsibility of the 
individual to the society and the role of the family” and the duties to the community over 
the benefits of individual rights,  granting prevalence to the Asian concept of „familiarity‟ 
against the „individuality‟ of the West. As well, it justifies the precedence of economic, 
social and cultural rights over civic and political ones under certain circumstances to 
“enable economic growth and social cohesion”. 
This being explained, the prospects of action of the ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights towards the promotion of the rights of the Rohingya in 
Myanmar sees grim in the near future. Until the Commission does not embrace 
international human rights standards with unambiguous procedures, its capacities will 
remain limited. In this regards, prospects for further analysis relies in evidence collected by 
authors as Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, which argue that authoritarian governments which 
commit to international human rights law are still likely to perpetuate human rights 
violations (Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2007). This challenges the aspects exposed in this 
dissertation paper but represents an opportunity to reassess the success prospects of 
international human rights regimes.  
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